Both classical probability theory and quantum theory lend themselves to a Bayesian interpretation where probabilities represent degrees of belief, and where the various rules for combining and updating probabilities are but algorithms for plausible reasoning in the face of uncertainty. I elucidate the differences and commonalities of these two theories, and argue that they are in fact the two only algorithms to satisfy certain basic consistency requirements. In order to arrive at this result I develop an over-arching framework for plausible reasoning that incorporates both classical probability and quantum theory as special cases. *
Introduction
Niels Bohr once remarked that physics was to be regarded "not so much as the study of something a priori given" but rather as the development of "methods for ordering and surveying human experience" [1] . Such methods, if they exist, are tantamount to basic consistency requirements for any form of reasoning about the external world. Even though this may not have been on his mind when he said it, his comment fully applies to classical probability theory (and by extension also to classical statistical mechanics): In the modern Bayesian view probability theory is not primarily concerned with observed relative frequencies; rather, it is regarded as a quantitative tool for plausible reasoning. As such, probability theory constitutes but an extension of conventional logic. Excellent introductions to this subject can be found in the very readable book by Sivia [2] and the seminal work of Jaynes [3, 4] .
Quantum theory is inherently probabilistic. While it displays many counterintuitive features, it is distinguished by a high degree of internal consistency. Does it therefore, too, lend itself to a Bayesian interpretation [5, 6] ? More precisely, does quantum theory, too, represent some kind of "algorithm" for plausible reasoning? There are indications that this might be the case, as quantum theory has been linked to concepts such as a modified propositional calculus, learning and-most recently-information processing:
• One of the earliest attempts (long before the advent of modern Bayesianism) to axiomatize quantum theory started from a generalisation of classical propositional calculus, relaxing the requirement that all propositions be jointly decidable and resulting in a mathematical structure dubbed "quantum logic" [7, 8, 9, 10] ; the key result of this approach being that propositions within (an irreducible building block of) such a "quantum logic" can always be identified with subspaces of a Hilbert space over some skew field [11] .
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• The discontinuous change of the density matrix upon quantum measurement has been shown to be closely related to Bayes' learning rule [12] . This rule stipulates how probabilities are to be updated in the light of new data. It allows agents with different initial beliefs to learn and eventually to reach a consensus by means of systematic experimental testing.
• Finally, ongoing research in the fast-growing field of quantum information keeps revealing the intimate connections of quantum theory with, and its potential power for, information processing [13, 14, 15, 16] . There is even a recent proposal to reduce the key features of quantum theory-albeit not the full Hilbert space structure-to a small number of purely information-theoretic constraints [17] .
Yet if indeed classical probability theory and quantum theory both lend themselves to a Bayesian interpretation, and hence both constitute algorithms for plausible reasoning-"laws of thought" rather than empirical models-then numerous questions arise: Where precisely lie their differences and commonalities? What are their respective domains of applicability? Is there an over-arching, more general framework for plausible reasoning that encompasses both classical probability and quantum theory as special cases? And could there be even more algorithms, i.e., probabilistic theories that differ from both classical probability and quantum theory but exhibit similar internal consistency and equally permit a Bayesian interpretation?
In this paper I take first steps towards developing the over-arching framework mentioned above. In the spirit of, but with less detail and rigor than Jaynes [3] I spell out basic consistency requirements that must be satisfied by any algorithm for plausible reasoning, thereby making explicit-and carefully avoiding-all those assumptions that might steer us prematurely towards the classical case. One key feature that we demand of any framework for plausible reasoning-classical, quantum or otherwise-is the existence of a Bayes' rule which provides a quantitative prescription for how agents with diverging (and inevitably subjective) initial beliefs can reach, through systematic experimental procedures, consensus on a single common probability assignment. Such consensus-building is a key prerequisite for the possibility of collaborative scientific inquiry and thus, ultimately, for the possibility of empirical research and scientific progress. I show how a Bayes' rule can be derived in the context of our general framework without making reference to any specific (classical or quantum) representation. Finally, I spell out which additional assumptions have to be made in order to arrive at classical probability and quantum theory as special cases.
While classical probability and quantum theory thus both fit under the umbrella of consistent reasoning, I argue that their principal differences can be summarised as follows. (i) Quantum theory violates a number of tacit classical assumptions: The Boolean operations "and", "or" are no longer well defined for arbitrary hypotheses; there are pairs of hypotheses that are not jointly decidable; and perhaps most notoriously, it is no longer possible to assign to hypotheses preexisting, non-contextual truth values which are merely revealed, rather than influenced, by the act of measurement. (ii) Quantum theory exhibits a larger degree of "smoothness" than classical probability: Even when the maximum evidence that can be garnered from experiment is bounded from above by a finite number, quantum theory still allows one to perform plausible reasoning about a continuum-rather than just a discrete set-of hypotheses; symmetry transformations constitute a Lie group rather than a discrete permutation group; and under these transformations all probabilities change in a continuous, rather than stepwise, fashion.
These two key differences are inextricably linked. There can be no consistent probability theory which at the same time satisfies all classical assumptions and exhibits the same degree of smoothness as quantum theory. The counterintuitive violation of classical assumptions is inevitable whenever one undertakes-as in quantum theory-to reason about a continuum of hypotheses even though the maximum evidence that can be garnered from experiment is bounded from above by a finite number. The central aim of this paper is to prove an even stronger version of this statement: Consistent reasoning about a continuum of hypotheses on the basis of evidence that, as a matter of principle, is not allowed to exceed some finite upper bound must necessarily follow the rules of quantum theory in complex Hilbert space. Quantum theory in complex Hilbert space is thus the only reasonable alternative to classical probability theory. Beyond classical probability and quantum theory, the general framework for plausible reasoning does not permit any further cases.
For the mathematical proof I investigate the group of "consistency-preserving" transformations in the continuous hypothesis space. Analysis of this group, which to a good part amounts to a simple dimension-counting exercise, reveals that it must be isomorphic to the unitary group U(d) where d is the finite upper bound on the evidence. This mandates the use of complex Hilbert space, and the identification of propositions with its subspaces, as the sole consistent alternative algorithm for plausible reasoning. In particular, this excludes models in real [18] or quaternionic [19] Hilbert spaces which are in principle allowed by traditional quantum logic [8] .
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Inferring the Hilbert space structure of quantum theory by means of a dimensional analysis has been proposed before [21] . Like the proof given below, that earlier proposal invoked the correspondence between probability distributions and measurements (state preparation), rules for the composition of systems, and a continuity requirement; it focused on demonstrating that the manifold of (non-normalised) states has dimension P (d) = d 2 . However, it provided a rigorous proof only of P (d) = d µ , µ ∈ N, the cases µ ≥ 3 being excluded merely on the basis of a non-rigorous, albeit plausible, "simplicity" argument. In contrast to the approach presented here, the earlier proposal did not include a systematic study of the structure group and its dimension. And finally, it made extensive use of the concepts "pure state" and "fiducial state", as well as of the language of linear vector spaces: notions that are inspired by quantum theory and already very suggestive of the structure to be derived, and that we will be trying to avoid here.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we review some very basic concepts and consistency requirements of probability theory, thereby introducing terminology and notation that will serve us later on. In particular, we define the notion of "evidence" that-confirming an earlier intuition by Fuchs [22] -will play a pivotal role as the sole parameter of the theory. (Later the maximum evidence in the quantum case will be identified with the Hilbert space dimension.) In Section 3 we spell out those additional assumptions that are (often implicitly) made in classical probability theory, yet that we will refrain from using in our more general framework. In Section 4 we delve deeper into the formal development of our general theory, in particular its symmetries. In Section 5 we turn to the central issue of learning by experiment and consider general measurements on exchangeable sequences, the de Finetti representation, and a generalised Bayes' rule that does not depend on the specific (classical or quantum) representation of the general framework. In Section 6 we show that our general framework for consistent reasoning does indeed contain quantum theory as a special case, and highlight its main features and differences from the classical case. Finally, Section 7 contains the main result of this paper. Investigating carefully the group of structure-preserving symmetry transformations, and requiring that despite finiteness of the evidence d it be a continuous Lie group, leads unequivocally to the unitary group U(d) as the sole permissible structure group. This proves the unique position of quantum theory in complex Hilbert space as the only reasonable alternative to classical probability theory.
We note that nowhere will we make reference to specific length or energy scales. Hence even though quantum phenomena are most prevalent in the microscopic world, there is nothing in our line of argument that restricts it to that domain.
Basic concepts
In this Section we review some key concepts of probability theory, thereby introducing terminology and notation that will serve us later on.
The objects to which probabilities are assigned are hypotheses. Some (but not all) of these hypotheses may be related by logical implication: x ⊆ a means that if hypothesis x is true then hypothesis a is also true; hypothesis x is a "refinement" of hypothesis a. Logical implication constitutes a partial order: It is (i) reflexive, x ⊆ x; (ii) antisymmetric, x ⊆ y, y ⊆ x ⇒ x = y; and (iii) transitive, x ⊆ y, y ⊆ z ⇒ x ⊆ z. There is a unique null element ∅, sometimes called the "absurd hypothesis", which is always false and hence implies all others (ex falso quodlibet): x = ∅ ⇔ x ⊆ a ∀a. And there is a maximal element Ω, sometimes called the "trivial hypothesis", which is always true and hence implied by all others: x = Ω ⇔ a ⊆ x ∀a. The negation "not x" of a hypothesis x is itself a hypothesis and denoted byx. It is absurd to negate a trivial hypothesis,Ω = ∅. Double negation returns the original hypothesis,x = x. Two hypotheses are said to "contradict" each other, a ⊥ b, if whenever one of them is true the other must be false. A set of hypotheses {b i } shall be called a "set of alternative refinements" of a if b i ⊆ a ∀i and they are mutually exclusive, b i ⊥ b j ∀i = j. This set of alternative refinements is "complete" if in addition the refinements are collectively exhaustive, x ⊥ b i ∀i ⇔ x ⊥ a; we shall then write {b i } ≺ a. A trivial example is the pair {x,x} of a hypothesis and its negation which clearly contradict each other, x ⊥x, and of which one must always be true, so {x,x} ≺ Ω. An incomplete set of alternative refinements can always be made complete by adding to it the unique hypothesis "a, but not any of
Having ascertained the truth of a certain hypothesis a, the maximum amount of additional evidence that can still be garnered from a most refined experiment equals the maximum number of alternative refinements of a; it shall be denoted by
and has the obvious properties
A hypothesis a can be decomposed into ever more accurate alternative refinements in an iterative, tree-like fashion by first identifying some initial complete set of alternative refinements, then decomposing each of these refinements into a further complete set of alternative refinements, and so on until this process comes to a halt because hypotheses cannot be refined any further. Regardless of the precise path chosen to arrive at such a maximal decomposition, the total number of outermost branches at the end of the process must always be the same and equal to the maximum additional evidence d(a). This implies
A probability distribution ρ assigns to each hypothesis x a real number ρ(x) ≡ prob(x | ρ) between 0 and 1. In the Bayesian approach-as opposed to the orthodox frequentist approach-probabilities are not defined as limits of relative frequencies. Rather, they constitute some agent's "degrees of belief" that can be legitimately assigned not just to ensembles but also to individual systems; their totality, i.e., the probability distribution ρ embodies his or her "knowledge" about all hypotheses in question. Bayesian probability theory is thus much more broadly applicable than the orthodox frequentist approach. The assignment of probabilities is not, however, entirely at an agent's discretion but must satisfy a number of consistency requirements to avoid circular reasoning and to make sure that if there are several different ways of using the same information then one should always arrive at the same conclusions, irrespective of the particular analysis-path chosen. These consistency requirements were first studied systematically by Cox [23] , and their quantitative manifestations shall be outlined further below. They ensure that Bayesian and frequentist approach will yield identical results in those cases where a large N limit exists; and that there exist systematic experimental procedures by which different agents with varying, inevitably subjective prior beliefs may eventually reach consensus on a single, "intersubjective" posterior probability assignment.
To start with, probability distributions must satisfy the common sense requirement that the more refined a hypothesis, the smaller its probability of being true: For any x, y,
Probabilities are calibrated such that
For a complete set of alternative refinements consistency stipulates the sum rule
with the special case
Applying this sum rule to the particular probability distribution
shows that it is consistent with the previous sum rule (4) for the evidence. Finally, we consider an experiment designed as follows. Given a prior probability distribution ρ the experiment shall test for a complete set of alternative refinements {b i } ≺ Ω, one of which must necessarily be found true. The experimenter's knowledge-and thus the probability distributionchanges in two steps in the course of the experiment, which are to be carefully distinguished: (i) upon learning that the experiment has been performed, yet with outcome still unknown; and (ii) upon learning about the outcome. This two-step process can be summarized graphically as follows:
Here prob(x | ·, ρ) denote the posterior probabilities conditional on having performed the test (but with outcome still unknown), and on actually having ascertained a specific b j , respectively. Consistency dictates that these two posteriors are related by
where the summands are shorthand for the product
Testing for a complete set of alternative refinements does not affect the posterior probabilities of its members,
while it might affect the posterior probabilities of other hypotheses not contained in the tested set. Having ascertained some b j , the relative probabilities of possible further refinements always stay unchanged:
Classical assumptions
In classical probability theory two additional assumptions are made that are so intuitive that they are seldom made explicit. As these tacit assumptions will be challenged in the context of quantum theory, however, we will make an effort here to spell them out explicitly. First, it is taken for granted that each hypothesis does have a definite preexisting truth value. This preexisting truth value is merely revealed, but not influenced in any way, by the act of measurement. The assignment of the truth value to a given hypothesis is "noncontextual" in the sense that it must not depend on whichever group of other hypotheses one might choose to test with it. Secondly, all hypotheses are assumed to be jointly decidable, i.e., for any set of hypotheses an experiment can be devised-at least in principleby which all their truth values can be jointly ascertained. This implies in particular that there is no limitation to amalgamating arbitrary hypotheses into combined, more refined hypotheses using the Boolean operation "and" (∩).
The first assumption implies that the first step in the process (9) actually has no effect at all,
and the second assumption allows one to derive the product rule
which together with definition (11) yields
Applying the product rule a second time with x and b i interchanged, and using the symmetry
This theorem prescribes how the probability that some hypothesis x is true must be updated, from prior prob(x | ρ) to posterior prob(x | b i , ρ), in the light of new data b i ; it thus encapsulates the process of learning. Bayes' theorem is of great practical importance in data analysis as it relates the quantity of interest, the posterior probability that x is true given the data b i , to a term that is usually easier to assign, the probability-also called "likelihood function"-prob(b i | x, ρ) that we would observe the measured data if the hypothesis was true. As a matter of course, all the above probabilities are conditional on the prior knowledge embodied in the probability distribution ρ.
Another quantitative ramification of the tacit classical assumptions, in particular of the existence of the "and" operation, is the so-called marginalisation equation
which follows from combined application of the product rule (15) and sum rule (7). This result, too, is of great practical use in that it allows one to deal with so-called "nuisance parameters" {b i }, i.e., features of the data which by necessity must be included in the mathematical analysis but which constitute details of some broader property a that are ultimately not of interest. Joint decidability and the existence of the "and" operation further allow one to express "contradiction" in the simple and familiar form
If for a hypothesis e it is d(e) = 1 then e is "most refined" in the sense that it does not allow any further decomposition into more accurate refinements; it is implied by no hypothesis other than itself and the absurd hypothesis, x ⊂ e ⇒ x = ∅. The collection of all most refined hypotheses shall be called the "hypothesis space". By definition two different most refined hypotheses e, f cannot have the combined hypothesis "e and f " as a common nonabsurd refinement, so it is necessarily e ∩ f = ∅; and by virtue of the above equivalence (19)
i.e., any two most refined hypotheses must be either identical or mutually exclusive. The set of all most accurate refinements of some hypothesis a is thus automatically isomorphic to a complete set of alternative refinements of a,
and hence
In other words, given a, the maximum amount of additional evidence that an experimenter is still able to accumulate equals the cardinality of that part of the hypothesis space which is compatible with a. Finally, for any probability distribution ρ and non-trivial hypothesis a ⊂ Ω there is a unique "constrained distribution" ρ| a defined no longer on all hypotheses but on the set of refinements {x | x ⊆ a} only, and satisfying the matching condition ρ| a (x) = ρ(x) ∀x ⊆ a. It is not necessarily normalised to ρ| a (a) = 1. Such a constrained distribution is completely specified by the d(a) independent probabilities {ρ(e) | e ⊆ a, d(e) = 1}. The set of all constrained distributions {ρ| a } therefore comprises a continuous manifold P a of dimension dim
In the following we shall develop probability theory further, starting from the very basic consistency requirements of Section 2. In doing so the tacit additional assumptions discussed in the current Section shall be in the back of our mind to guide our intuition and to check for plausibility. Yet we shall refrain from actually using them (unless stated explicitly) so as to retain maximum flexibility for possible non-classical extensions of the theory.
Tests and symmetries
This Section is devoted to a more formal development of the general framework. In particular, we shall elaborate on its symmetries. These will help us later to elucidate the differences between classical probability and quantum theory, and to establish the key result that no further consistent algorithms exist.
We start by introducing some terminology. We denote the set of all possible refinements of some non-trivial hypothesis a ⊂ Ω by
and-as in the classical case above-the set of all constrained distributions on L a by P a . From now on hypotheses shall always be assumed to be elements of L a and distributions to be elements of P a unless stated explicitly otherwise; for ease of notation we shall also drop the subscript "| a " from the constrained distributions. The set L a is endowed with a partial order reflecting logical implications between its elements. In P a , too, there is a partial order defined by
For any probability distribution ρ ∈ P a we define its "support" supp(ρ) as the unique hypothesis in L a for which
This allows one to define the "broadness" of a probability distribution as
with properties analogous to those of its counterpart for hypotheses:
For any ρ ∈ P a and b ∈ L a we define the function θ b ρ :
where θ b (x | ρ) in turn is given by Eq. (11) . This function satisfies all consistency requirements for a constrained probability distribution and hence is itself an element of P a . It can be viewed as the posterior constrained distribution after having tested for-but not yet ascertained-a single hypothesis b in a special experiment designed such that failure to pass the test automatically leads to the maximal hypothesis a being set to "false". Upon performing such an experiment the partial order of constrained probability distributions is preserved,
The support of the probability distribution becomes constrained to being a refinement of the hypothesis just tested,
with strict inequality if and only if b has some non-absurd refinement whose prior probability vanishes:
We demand that testing never lead to a broadening of probability distributions,
This is a weaker requirement than supp(θ x ρ) ⊆ supp(ρ). In fact, the latter need not necessarily hold so long as we refrain from invoking any of the tacit classical assumptions. Now we turn to symmetries. Automorphisms of the set of hypotheses and of the set of probability distributions, respectively, that satisfy
and preserve the logical structure in the set of hypotheses
as well as the partial order in the set of probability distributions,
constitute a group. The action of this group amounts to a "relabelling" of hypotheses that preserves internal consistency in the sense that it leaves ordering relations in both the set of hypotheses and the set of probability distributions intact. Relabelling and testing of hypotheses may be freely combined and their order of execution exchanged provided the hypothesis being tested is subjected to relabelling, too:
The support of a probability distribution transforms in a covariant fashion,
In contrast, both the level of coarse-graining of a hypothesis and the broadness of a probability distribution are invariants:
The subgroup of all g that in addition satisfy g(a) = a and g(x) = x ∀x ⊥ a for some non-trivial hypothesis a ⊂ Ω shall be denoted by G a . This subgroup maps both L a and P a onto themselves but is defined-and may potentially act in a non-trivial manner-also on hypotheses and distributions not contained in these sets. We assume that the representation of G a on L a is "irreducible" in the sense that whenever two hypotheses x, y ∈ L a are at the same level of coarsegraining d, there is always some consistent relabelling to transform one into the other:
Beyond their level of coarse-graining and their inclusion in L a these hypotheses have no other property that is group-invariant. Consequently their respective substructures must be isomorphic, L x ∼ L y and P x ∼ P y . The latter therefore form an equivalence class that depends on the level of coarsegraining only, and that we shall denote by L(d) and P(d), respectively. Likewise the associated structure group depends on the level of coarse-graining only and shall be denoted by G ( Complete sets of alternative refinements of a can be categorised according to their level of coarse-graining and thus clustered in collections
hence when referring to the equivalence class characterised by d ≡ i k i we may omit the subscripts x and y. Thanks to (41), which carries over to complete sets of alternative refinements that are at the same level of coarse-graining, each M({k i }) constitutes a homogeneous space on which G(d) acts transitively. The stability group of a specific {b i } ∈ M a ({k i }) equals the product of all G b i acting on the respective substructures L b i ; so in terms of equivalence classes, M({k i }) can be expressed as the quotient
In an experiment of the type (9) the intermediate probability distribution prob(x | {b i }, ρ) can be communicated to a distant agent who is not informed about the experimental setup in either of two equivalent ways: (a) by giving the full probability distribution in P a ; or (b) by specifying {b i } ∈ M a ({k i }) and then a collection of reduced probability distributions in
this equivalence can be expressed as
To summarise, our general framework has the maximum available evidence d as its sole parameter. The key mathematical objects are the sets L, P, M and the group G, all labelled by d. There are various symmetries linking these objects, notably the isomorphisms (43) and (44). On P there are two fundamental operations, symmetry transformations and tests. The former always conserves, whereas the latter may possibly narrow, the broadness of a probability distribution.
The possibility of learning
Beyond the consistency requirements and symmetries laid out in the preceding sections we demand of any framework for plausible reasoning that it be compatible with the fundamental tenet of the scientific method: that it is possible to learn by experiment. Agents with diverging, inevitably subjective prior beliefs (and hence probability assignments) must have a way to attain a consensus, and thus to learn, by means of experimental tests. In the classical case this is guaranteed in a straightforward manner by the Bayes' theorem (17) . For our general framework there must exist a comparable learning algorithm that does not rely on the tacit classical assumptions.
Experiments typically involve repeated "trials" on a sequence of identically prepared systems, where the precise mathematical meaning of these terms will be specified further below. As long as agents can at least agree on the suitability of the given sequence for experimental testing, and if only they are not so dogmatic as to assign prior distributions with unduly narrow support, then after a sufficiently large number of trials they should reach consensus on a single "intersubjective" posterior probability distribution for the sequence's individual constituents. In this Section we shall describe with some mathematical rigor how in our general framework such convergence to a consensus comes about. We start out by introducing the concept of "composite" systems, then move on to consider the special case of "exchangeable" systems which lend themselves to repeated identical measurements and hence to systematic consensus-building. At the end we shall see that the iterative process of reaching consensus-and thus collective learning-finds its mathematical expression in a generalised Bayes' rule on the level of metaprobabilities.
First we introduce some basic properties of composite systems. Let a system be composed of two subsystems A and B with respective maximum evidence d A , d B and complete sets of alternative refinements {x If the hypotheses about the subsystems are "most refined" then so are the combined hypotheses about the composite system,
which implies that the maximum evidence about the composite system must be the product d A · d B . Therefore, if the sets of hypotheses pertaining to the respective subsystems belong to the equivalence classes L(d A ) and L(d B ), and the associated sets of probability distributions to P(d A ) and P(d B ), then the hypotheses and probability distributions pertaining to the composite system must be in
, respectively. The maximal element of the composite system is simply the combination of the maximal elements of the subsystems,
The composite system is assigned some probability distribution ρ AB ∈ P(d A d B ). Its two subsystems are said to be statistically "independent" if and only if there exist respective probability distributions ρ A ∈ P(d A ) and ρ B ∈ P(d B ) such that ρ AB = ρ A ⊗ ρ B , where the "product distribution"
and the combined hypotheses (y A , y B ) have the meaning described above. If, on the other hand, ρ AB = ρ A ⊗ ρ B then the two subsystems are said to be statistically "correlated".
The set (or more precisely, equivalence class) P(d) of probability distributions on L(d) forms a continuous manifold of dimension
In other words, probability distributions for a system with maximum evidence d are specified by P (d) real parameters. In the special case d = 1 there is only a single non-absurd hypothesis, and hence any (non-normalised) probability distribution is uniquely specified by the probability of this single hypothesis being true; i.e., P (1) = 1 .
For arbitrary d, too, the P (d) degrees of freedom of a probability distribution must be related to some set of probabilities: Only as probabilities they become amenable to rational discourse and learning among agents. The most general setup to establish such a correspondence is to embed the system of interest (denoted by S) into a larger one by coupling it to an "ancilla" S an and then to consider the probabilities of some complete set of alternative refinements pertaining not to S alone but to the composite system S × S an . While the probability distribution ρ ∈ P(d S ) for the system of interest is not known a priori and therefore the subject of investigation, the ancilla is assumed to have some known probability distribution σ ∈ P(d San ). Upon coupling (and given that there are no prior correlations between system and ancilla) the composite system attains the product distribution ρ⊗σ. Pertaining to this composite system then, we have complete sets of alternative refine-
Thus the most general experimental setup-in short: "measurement"-around S is characterised by a pair (σ, {b i }). This measurement is "informationally complete" if the set of probabilities {(ρ ⊗ σ)(b i )} suffices to determine uniquely the full probability distribution ρ for the system of interest. We demand that at least one such informationally complete measurement exist. The smallest number of {b i } to give an informationally complete measurement must by definition equal the number P (d S ) of degrees of freedom of the probability distribution ρ. This operational prescription for mapping degrees of freedom onto probabilities allows one to derive a power law for P (d) as follows. Let us denote two systems by A and B, and let the pairs (σ A , {b 
This implies the product rule
and, combined with the initial condition P (1) = 1, the power law
which is more general than-but perfectly consistent with-the classical result (23).
The above concepts can be generalised to the case of a large system composed of N subsystems. Assuming that all subsystems have the same size (i.e., maximum evidence) d, the large system will be described by some probability distribution ρ (N ) ∈ P(d N ). If and only if all subsystems are statistically independent, this total distribution has the product form
If moreover the available information about the individual subsystems is identical for all subsystems-embodied in the same ρ ∈ P(d)-then the form of the total distribution simplifies further to
Statistical independence of, and identity of knowledge about, different constituents of a larger composite system are however two separate requirements that do not always go together. In fact, in an experiment conducted on a sequence of systems-each of which may be thought of as a constituent, and the entire sequence as a composite system-agents can often agree on the identity of the constituents but not necessarily on their statistical independence. The minimal consensus that there is no information that would justify discrimination between constituents is expressed mathematically by the symmetry constraint
for arbitrary permutations π of the set {1, . . . , N}, and for an arbitrary set of hypotheses {x i } being tested in all systems. This symmetry must hold for all N; and moreover, it should be possible to extend ρ (N ) to an equally symmetric distribution for arbitrarily many constituents. The latter requirement translates into
where ρ (M ) and ρ (M −N ) must also be symmetric and where I d denotes, as before, the maximal element of L(d) with d(I d ) = d. The denominator accounts for the fact that the distributions need not be normalised to one. If ρ (N ) satisfies both the symmetry and the extendability requirements then it is called "exchangeable". It can be thought of informally as the description of a subsequence of an infinite sequence of systems whose order is irrelevant [20] .
An exchangeable probability distribution for an N-partite system can be written uniquely in the so-called de Finetti representation
where the "meta-probability" prob(ρ) ≥ 0 is normalised by
The integration is over the manifold of probability distributions, with dρ being a suitable measure. The de Finetti representation makes it possible to think of an exchangeable probability distribution as if it were a probabilistic mixture of product states ρ ⊗N with respective meta-probability (or "probability of probabilities" [6] ) prob(ρ). The existence of such a de Finetti representation has been proven for both classical probability theory and quantum theory [20] . In the following we briefly sketch an argument why this should carry over to the more general framework considered here. Let (σ, {b i }) be a minimal-i.e., #{b i } = P (d)-informationally complete measurement on the individual constituent. Given that ρ (N ) is exchangeable, so is ρ (N ) ⊗ σ ⊗N ; and with the extendability property (52), as well as the sum rule (7), this implies
(55) where we have abbreviated I ≡ I d·dan . Due to the permutation symmetry (51) the probability on the right hand side depends only on the frequencies {M i } with which the hypotheses {b i } occur in the argument, so we can write
The normalisation factor eliminates double counting such that
Also due to permutation symmetry the summations in Eq. (55) can be recast in the form i N+1
. . .
where the {N i } are defined as in Eq. (57) but with summation to N only. We are free to consider the limit of an infinite sequence extension, M → ∞.
In this limit it is asymptotically
For each {M i } there is a unique probability distribution
Applying to the latter the extendability property (52), this leads finally to (64) which (i) using the fact that (σ ⊗N , {(b
is a minimal informationally complete measurement on the entire sequence of N systems and (ii) taking the continuum limit, translates into the de Finetti representation (53).
After all this preparatory work we finally turn to the kind of experiment that will allow agents with differing initial beliefs to reach a consensus. Such experiments involve several trials on an exchangeable sequence. Let N be the "length" of (i.e., number of systems contained in) the exchangeable sequence, and K (K < N) the number of trials. Each trial has P (d) + 1 possible outcomes: one of the P (d) alternative refinements {b i } ≺ I may be found true, or none of them may be found true. The latter is not an absurd possibility because I = Ω, and hence its negationĪ may have a non-vanishing probability. To denote these possible outcomes we define the set
where the index i now ranges from 0 to P (d) rather than from 1 to P (d).
The probabilities of these P (d) + 1 possible outcomes must sum to one, so only P (d) probabilities are independent. Having ascertained the outcomes b
of K trials, the relative probabilities of further refinements must equal their prior values,
in accordance with the conservation law (13) . On the left-hand side of this equation the denominator is by definition equal to one. On the right-hand side we can use the de Finetti representation (53) for ρ (N ) to write the denominator in the form
(67) and the numerator in the form prob(b
This leads to
with prob(ρ|b
and the shorthand notations
prob(b
Eq. (70) has the form of the classical Bayes' theorem (17) , yet applies on a meta-level to "probabilities of probabilities" rather than to probabilities of hypotheses. After a sufficiently large number of trials the posterior metaprobability prob(ρ|b . . .b) will become peaked around that ρ which maximises the likelihood prob(b . . .b|ρ) and hence satisfies ρ(b j ) = K j /K, where K j denotes the measured frequency of outcome b j . Therefore posterior probabilities will eventually converge to observed relative frequencies regardless of the initial-inevitably subjective-belief. This presupposes, however, that ρ(b j ) = K j /K is not completely ruled out by the prior meta-probability prob(ρ). Agents must be sufficiently non-dogmatic not to rule out certain probability assignments a priori. To summarise, if only agents are not so dogmatic that they completely rule out alternative hypotheses a priori, and if they can at least agree on the fact that a given sequence is exchangeable, then after a sufficiently large number of trials they will reach consensus on a probability distribution for its individual constituents. It is in this sense that the scientific method-learning by experiment-allows one to progress from a diverse array of subjective priors to a consensus, and hence an "objective", posterior distribution. In physics such a consensus is always implicit when one speaks of the "state" of a system as being the result of a well-defined preparation procedure [24] . The possibility to arrive at intersubjective probability assignments in the fashion described above is a property that we should demand of any scientific theory based on probabilities.
The quantum case
We saw in Section 3 that classically the maximum available evidence d equals the cardinality of the hypothesis space (Eq. (22)). Using definition (42) this equality may be expressed in the form 
Upon action of the discrete symmetry group probability distributions generally change in a discontinuous fashion. In quantum theory the situation is radically different [25] . The various general concepts that were introduced in the preceding sections translate into mathematical objects in Hilbert space; these are summarised in Table 1 . In particular, the maximum available evidence d is given by the Hilbert space dimension. It is finite whenever the quantum system is finite-dimensional. On the other hand the hypothesis space for such a quantum system comprises all possible pure states and hence constitutes a continuum. The maximum amount of evidence that any experimenter can accumulate (a finite number) is thus strictly smaller than the hypothesis space (a continuum), not due to practical limitations but as a matter of principle. It is in this sense that in quantum theory maximal information is "not complete" [26, 27] .
The peculiar "smoothness" of quantum theory manifests itself in various ways. The symmetry group G qu (d) is no longer a finite group but the unitary group U(d), a compact Lie group of dimension
Likewise the collections M qu ({k i }) of complete sets of alternative refinements are no longer finite sets but continuous manifolds. Their dimensions equal
which includes as a special case the manifold dimension of the hypothesis space
And the manifold of probability distributions has no longer the classical dimension (23)) but the larger dimension
Finally, quantum probabilities change under unitary transformations in a continuous fashion, where "continuity" is defined as follows. The symmetry group G(d) is a Lie group and hence endowed with a group-invariant distance measure. It is therefore possible to define, for any (infinitesimal) δ > 0, an (infinitesimal) neighborhood of the identity element 1 G
Given a probability distribution ρ ∈ P(d), all refinements of its support have non-vanishing probabilities that are greater than or equal to
"Continuity" means that probabilities that were initially greater than zero not suddenly jump to zero upon an infinitesimal transformation; in more rigorous mathematical terms,
By virtue of Eq. (33) this is equivalent to
Quantum theory violates all tacit classical assumptions spelt out in Section 3:
• The classical Boolean operations "and", "or" are not well defined for arbitrary hypotheses. Indeed, even though in certain special cases they are implicit in our definitions of ⊥, ≺ or θ b , we have avoided employing these classical operations in our formulation of the general theory.
• Propositions pertaining to non-commuting observables and hence certain pairs of hypotheses are not jointly decidable. (Two hypotheses x, y ∈ L(d) are said to be jointly decidable if there is a complete set of alternative refinements {b i } i∈I ≺ I d with subsets of the index set I x , I y ⊆ I such that {b i } i∈Ix ≺ x and {b i } i∈Iy ≺ y.) This renders quantum theory inherently probabilistic in the sense that there must always be some hypotheses whose probabilities are neither 0 nor 1.
• It is not possible to assign to hypotheses preexisting, non-contextual truth values that are merely revealed, rather than influenced, by the act of measurement (Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem) [28] . Our image of reality (i.e., our knowledge as embodied in our probability assignments) that emerges through repeated acts of measurement thus reflects as much our history of intervention as it reflects the external world. 4 Moreover, there is the novel phenomenon of non-classical correlations termed "entanglement". It is exhibited by composite systems whose probability distribution (density matrix) cannot be written as a linear combination of product distributions,
Entanglement produces unique statistical features that cannot be mimicked with hidden classical variables (Bell inequality) [28] . Notwithstanding these findings, quantum theory has all the desired features of a general probabilistic theory, in particular:
• It satisfies the basic consistency requirements outlined in Section 2.
• It exhibits the symmetries outlined in Section 4.
• It has a de Finetti representation [20] and a Bayes' rule for metaprobabilities [12] . The latter allows for the convergence of differing initial probability assignments, through the experimental procedure described in Section 5, to an intersubjective consensus distribution.
In conclusion, the key features of quantum theory can be subsumed under three main headings:
1. Quantum theory constitutes a perfectly consistent framework for plausible reasoning and scientific inquiry, fulfilling all requirements laid out in Sections 2, 4 and 5.
2. It does so without invoking any of the tacit classical assumptions of Section 3 -on the contrary, these assumptions are all being violated. This is what renders many predictions of quantum theory counterintuitive.
3. Quantum theory exhibits a high degree of "smoothness". Despite the maximum available evidence (in the case of finite-dimensional systems) being finite, hypotheses and symmetry transformations form continua rather than discrete sets. Moreover, probabilities change under symmetry transformations in a continuous fashion.
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The latter two findings are inextricably linked: There can be no consistent probability theory which at the same time satisfies all classical assumptions and exhibits the same degree of smoothness as quantum theory. The counterintuitive violation of classical assumptions is inevitable whenever one undertakes-as in quantum theory-to reason about a continuum of hypotheses even though the maximum evidence that can be garnered from experiment is bounded from above by a finite number.
In the next and final Section we shall take these considerations one step further and derive the central result of this paper: Plausible reasoning about a continuum of hypotheses on the basis of evidence that-as a matter of principle-is restricted to be finite must of necessity follow the rules of quantum theory in complex Hilbert space. More precisely, whenever there is a mismatch between evidence having-as a matter of principle-a finite upper bound on the one hand, and the hypotheses under consideration forming a continuum on the other, then plausible reasoning about this continuum of hypotheses, if it is to satisfy the minimal consistency requirements of Sections 2, 4 and 5, cannot but follow the rules of quantum theory in complex Hilbert space. Quantum theory in complex Hilbert space is thus the only reasonable alternative to classical probability theory.
Exclusion of further cases
The idea of the argument is as follows. Requiring "smoothness" implies that even for finite d the symmetry group G(d) must be a Lie group. Its dimension, denoted by G(d), must be greater than zero. Likewise the hypothesis space and, more generally, the collections M({k i }) of complete sets of alternative refinements must be continuous manifolds of non-zero dimension. By virtue of the quotient representation (43) their dimensions are related to that of the group via
In addition, they are related to the dimension of the manifold of probability distributions by virtue of the symmetry constraint (44),
Combining these two equations and taking into account the power law (49) for P (d) implies that the group dimension must have the general form
In the classical case with a finite hypothesis space it is (µ, ν) = (1, 0). Here, however, we consider the case where hypotheses form a continuum and hence M({k i }) > 0 for some {k i }; which is only possible for µ ≥ 2. Demanding that probabilities change under symmetry transformations in a continuous fashion in the sense of Eq. (82) leaves in fact only µ = 2; and analysing more carefully how the group dimension must behave in order to preserve consistency upon composition of systems yields ν = 1, leaving (µ, ν) = (2, 1) as the only admissible alternative to the classical case. Given that G(d) must be a compact Lie group this leads unequivocally to G(d) ∼ U(d) [30] and hence to quantum theory in complex Hilbert space. The remainder of this Section shall be devoted to the mathematical proof of these claims. We start out by investigating more closely the ramifications of the continuity condition (82). In the following we shall assume that we are within the continuous region, i.e., all group elements g are in the infinitesimal neighborhood g ∈ G δ (d) as defined in Eq. (79). For further analysis we introduce an arbitrary auxiliary hypothesis b,
where the respective levels of coarse-graining k := d(supp(ρ)), l := d(b) and
Moreover, we define three additional auxiliary hypotheses z, b\z and b * z as follows: 
By definition it is z ⊆ b * z . As
and hence ρ g −1 (b)\g −1 (z) = 0 ,
which in turn implies g(ρ) (b\z) = 0
and further g(supp(ρ)) ⊥ b\z ,
it is also g(supp(ρ)) ⊆ b * z .
As for the respective levels of coarse-graining of these auxiliary hypotheses, Eq. (34) and group invariance imply on the one hand
while on the other hand b ⊇ supp(ρ) and the continuity condition (82) yield
Together these inequalities give
and hence d(z) = k. In sum, the levels of coarse graining take the values
As supp(ρ) and z are both refinements of b and have the same level of coarsegraining k, they are both elements of the set
hence given b, the hypothesis z is uniquely specified by M({k, l − k}) real parameters. Likewise, z and g(supp(ρ)) are both refinements of b * z , again at the same level of coarse-graining k, and thus elements of the set
so given both b and z, and hence b * z , the transformed support g(supp(ρ)) is uniquely specified by M({k, d − l}) real parameters. Therefore the total number of parameters needed to specify g(supp(ρ)) is the sum M({k, l − k}) + M({k, d − l}), which must equal the number of parameters that would have been needed without the above auxiliary construction:
Such linearity in the second argument is only possible if µ = 2, Q.E.D.
For the second claim ν = 1 we give two independent arguments. Both lines of reasoning pertain to the composition of two systems A, B andfollowing similar ideas in Section 5-aim to show that the group dimension must satisfy the product rule G (d A d B ) = G(d A )G(d B ) . The first argument is very simple: We require that it be possible to understand any symmetry transformation of the composite system as a "concerted action" of symmetry transformations of the individual subsystems. In mathematical terms, associated with the two subsystem symmetry groups G ( The second, slightly more elaborate argument relates the degrees of freedom of a symmetry transformation to a set of probabilities. We start out with the following definition. We say that a general measurement (σ, {b i }) with σ ∈ P(d an ), {b i } ≺ I danD on systems of size D can "resolve" the group G(d), d ≤ D if there is (i) a faithful representation of G(d) on P(D) and (ii) at least one distribution ρ ∈ P(D) such that the set of probabilities {(σ ⊗ g(ρ))(b i )}, combined with the knowledge that g must be a symmetry transformation, uniquely determines g ∈ G(d). The smallest number of {b i } to permit such a resolution of the symmetry group must by definition equal the group dimension G(d). We require that if two measurements (σ A , {b 
